Vliegtuigongeval op 15 MAR 1993 met Boeing 737-130 N14212 - Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR)

Home » Database » 1993

Incident

Last updated: 20 June 2013

Status:	Definitief
Datum:	15 MRT 1993
Tijd:	09:20
Type:	Boeing 737-130
Luchtvaartmaatschappij:	Continental Air Lines
Registratie:	N14212
Constructienummer:	19029/108
Bouwjaar:	1968-12-07 (24 years 3 months)
Aantal vlieguren:	58997
Motoren:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7A
Bemanning:	slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 4
Passagiers:	slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 57
Totaal:	slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 61
Schade:	Licht
Gevolgen:	Repaired
Plaats:	Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR) (Verenigde Staten)
Fase:	Initiële klim (ICL)
Soort vlucht:	Binnenlandse lijnvlucht
Vliegveld van vertrek:	Newark International Airport, NJ (EWR/KEWR), Verenigde Staten
Vliegveld van aankomst:	Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC (GSO/KGSO), Verenigde Staten
Vluchtnummer:	1659

Beschrijving:
Continental Flight 1659 experienced a loss of control of the left aileron while departing from Newark. The captain stated that the airplane rolled to the left as soon as it became airborne. Considerable difficulty was experienced controlling the airplane, but when the flaps were retracted and full right aileron was applied, control was maintained with less difficulty. An in-flight visual inspection of the left aileron panel revealed the panel in the full up position. The crew elected to return to Newark. The captain reported that control became increasingly difficult during the approach to land when the flaps were extended from 15 degrees to 30 degrees. The captain said he used 30 degrees of flaps because of ice and snow on the runway at Newark. The captain reported that just before touchdown he needed full right aileron and a significant amount of left rudder to keep the airplane lined up with the runway. The airplane was landed without further incident, and none of the occupants were injured.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "Inadequate maintenance/inspection by company maintenance personnel, the manufacturer's inadequate inspection and/or replacement procedures for the aileron cables, and subsequent failure of the 'down' aileron control cable due to wear."

Bronnen:
» NTSB

Veiligheidsmaatregelen

NTSB issued 3 Safety Recommendations

Show all AD's and Safety Recommendations

Foto's

Kaart

Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Newark International Airport, NJ en Greensboro/High Point-Piedmont Triad International Airport, NC bedraagt 712 km (445 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.

languages:

Issued: 10-MAR-1994	To: FAA	A-94-064
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) TO OPERATORS OF BOEING 727 AND 737 AIRPLANES REQUIRING PERIODIC INSPECTION OF THE AILERON CABLES FOR BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL WEAR, AND FOR BROKEN WIRES, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE AREA OF THE CABLE CONTACTING THE PULLEYS. THE INSPECTION SHOULD INCLUDE RELEASING CABLE TENSION TO BETTER DETECT CABLE WEAR AND WIRE BREAKAGE AND ESTABLISHING A MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE REDUCTION IN CABLE DIAMETER WHERE PULLEY CONTACT OCCURS. BASED ON THE INSPECTIONS, DEVELOP SPECIFIC FLIGHT HOUR INTERVALS FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE CABLES. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action)
Issued: 10-MAR-1994	To: FAA	A-94-065
REQUIRE THAT THE BOEING COMPANY EXAMINE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A 737-100 AILERON CABLE FAILURE, AND PROVIDE APPROPRIATE FLIGHTCREW OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE BEST LANDING CONFIGURATION IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A FAILURE. (Closed - Acceptable Action)
Issued: 10-MAR-1994	To: FAA	A-94-066
CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY TO DETERMINE THE FREQUENCY OF SPOILER, RUDDER, AND AILERON CABLE FAILURES ON AIRPLANES WEIGHING 12,500 POUNDS OR GREATER. WHERE THE STUDY REVEALS FLIGHT CONTROL INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO BE INADEQUATE, REQUIRE APPROPRIATE REVISIONS TO THOSE INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND/OR ISSUE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES TO MANDATE SERVICE LIFE LIMITS TO ASSURE GREATER RELIABILITY OF THOSE CONTROL CABLES. (Closed - Acceptable Action)