Status:	Final
Date:	25 FEB 1994
Time:	19:46
Type:	Vickers 813 Viscount
Operator:	British World Airways
Registration:	G-OHOT
C/n / msn:	349
First flight:	1958
Total airframe hrs:	50995
Engines:	4 Rolls Royce 530 Dart
Crew:	Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 2
Passengers:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0
Total:	Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 2
Airplane damage:	Written off
Airplane fate:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:	7,5 km (4.7 mls) SW of Uttoxeter (United Kingdom)
Phase:	En route (ENR)
Nature:	Cargo
Departure airport:	Edinburgh-Turnhouse Airport (EDI/EGPH), United Kingdom
Destination airport:	Coventry-Baginton Airport (CVT/EGBE), United Kingdom
Flightnumber:	4272

Narrative:
The aircraft was en-route to Coventry in severe icing conditions when the no. 2 engine failed and the prop auto feathered. The no. 3 engine also ran down. The crew, at that moment descending from FL150, were cleared for an immediate descent to FL070 and then to FL050. The crew elected to divert to Birmingham since the engines wouldn't restart. They managed to restart the no. 2 engine a little later, but then the no. 4 engine failed. Just 5 minutes short of Birmingham load shedding occurred and radio and intercom were lost. The Viscount struck trees on down sloping terrain and broke up.

CAUSAL FACTORS: "i) Multiple engine failures occurred as a result of flight in extreme icing conditions. ;
ii) Incomplete performance of the emergency drills by the crew, as a result of not referring to the Emergency Checklist, prejudiced the chances of successful engine re-starts. ;
iii) Crew actions for securing and re-starting the failed engines, which were not in accordance with the operator's procedures, limited the power available. The drag from two unfeathered propellers of the failed engines and the weight of the heavily iced airframe resulted in a loss of height and control before the chosen diversion airfield could be reached. ;
iv) Poor Crew Resource Management reduced the potential for emergency planning, decision making and workload sharing. Consequently, the crew had no contingency plan for the avoidance of the forecast severe icing conditions, and also was unaware of the relative position of a closer diversion airfield which could have been chosen by making more effective use of air traffic services."

Sources:
» FSF Accident Prevention Vol. 52, No. 6 (June 1995)
» ICAO Adrep Summary 2/94 (#23)