Narrative:At 20:21 LT the DC-8 prepared to takeoff from RWY 01L for a flight to Westover AFB with the no. 1 engine inoperative. But the aircraft lost directional control and the crew aborted the takeoff. Six minutes afterwards they attempted to takeoff for the second time.
At 980 m into the takeoff roll the DC-8 started to veer to the left. At 1160 m the aircraft rotated with a tail strike but the tail remained in contact with the runway for another 250 m. At 1600 m the DC-8 finally became airborne and climbed to 30 m before crashing into the ground, left wing-first. The wreckage came to a halt at 2300 m.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "(1) The loss of directional control by the pilot in command during the takeoff roll, and his decision to continue the takeoff and initiate a rotation below the computed rotation airspeed, resulting in a premature lift-off, further loss of control and collision with the terrain. (2) The flight crew's lack of understanding of the three-engine takeoff procedures, and their decision to modify those procedures. (3) The failure of the company to ensure that the flight crew had adequate experience, training, and rest to conduct the nonroutine flight. Contributing to the accident was the inadequacy of Federal Aviation Administration oversight of Air Transport International and Federal Aviation Administration flight and duty time regulations that permitted a substantially reduced flight crew rest period when conducting a nonrevenue ferry flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 195 days (7 months) | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-95-06 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Flight with 1 engine inoperative
Tailstrike
Loss of control
Sources:
» Business & Commercial Aviation April 1996(88,94)
» ICAO Adrep Summary 2/96 (#23)
» NTSB/AAR-95/06
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 8 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 30-MAR-1995 | To: FAA | A-95-38 |
CONDUCT AN IMMEDIATE IN-DEPTH INSPECTION OF AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL (ATI) TO EXAMINE TRAINING, OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, & MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT. ALSO, AS PART OF THIS INSPECTION, EXAMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERSIGHT OF ATI BY THE LITTLE ROCK & DENVER FLIGHT STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 30-MAR-1995 | To: FAA | A-95-39 |
LIMIT OPERATIONS OF ENGINE-OUT FERRY FLIGHTS TO TRAINING, FLIGHT TEST, OR STANDARDIZATION FLIGHTCREWS THAT HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY TRAINED IN ENGINE-OUT PROCEDURES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 14-NOV-1995 | To: FAA | A-95-110 |
Review the effectiveness of the geographic unit oversight program, with particular emphasis on the oversight of supplemental air carriers and their international operations, and the improvement of overall communications between principal operations inspectors and geographic inspectors. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 14-NOV-1995 | To: FAA | A-95-111 |
Evaluate the surveillance programs to ensure that budget and personnel resources are sufficient and used effectively to maintain adequate oversight of the operation and maintenance of both passenger and cargo air carriers, irrespective of size. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 14-NOV-1995 | To: FAA | A-95-112 |
Require airplane manufacturers to revise one-engine inoperative takeoff procedures to provide adequate rudder availability for correcting directional deviations during the takeoff roll and provide performance figures and runway requirements compatible with the achievement of maximum asymmetric thrust at an appropriate speed greater than ground minimum control speed. (Closed - Reconsidered) |
Issued: 14-NOV-1995 | To: FAA | A-95-113 |
Finalize the review of current flight and duty time regulations and revise the regulations, as necessary, within 1 year to ensure that flight and duty time limitations take into consideration research findings in fatigue and sleep issues. The new regulations should prohibit air carriers from assigning flightcrews to flights conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 unless the flightcrews meet the flight and duty time limitations of 14 CFR Part 121 or other appropriate regulations. (Open - Unacceptable Response) |
Issued: 14-NOV-1995 | To: ATI | A-95-114 |
REVIEW THE ATI DC-8 OPERATING MANUAL DISCUSSION ON THREE-ENGINE TAKEOFFS TO ENSURE THAT IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE TO ALL PILOTS WHO MUST ACCOMPLISH SUCH TAKEOFFS. THIS SECTION OF THE MANUAL SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE SPECIFIECS OF PROPER THROTTLE APPLICATION TECHNIQUE. (Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action) |
Issued: 14-NOV-1995 | To: AIR TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL | A-95-115 |
DISCONTINUE THE COMPANY POLICY OF ROUTINELY ASSIGNING LINE FLIGHTCREWS FOR THREE-ENGINE FERRY OPERATIONS. ALLOW ONLY SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED, HIGHLY EXPERIENCE CREWMEMBERS TO PERFORM SUCH OPERATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos
accident date:
16-02-1995type: McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63F
registration: N782AL
accident date:
16-02-1995type: McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63F
registration: N782AL
accident date:
16-02-1995type: McDonnell Douglas DC-8-63F
registration: N782AL
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Kansas City International Airport, MO to Springfield-Westover Metro Airport, MA as the crow flies is 1878 km (1173 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.