| Issued: 29-JUL-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-074 |
| Require that, within 500 cycles of FAA approval of an engine "on wing" eddy current inspection process for Pratt and Whitney JT8D-200 series engine fan hub tierod holes, this inspection be performed on those hubs that have accumulated more that 10,000 cycles since new, prioritize the inspections to ensure that the fan hubs most at risk (data suggest those hubs with 10,000 to 15,000 cycles since new) are inspected first. This inspection can be superseded by the redundant inspection urged in safety recommendation A-96-75. (Superseded by A-98-19 and A-98-20) (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded) |
| Issued: 29-JUL-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-075 |
| Require an inspection of all Pratt and Whitney JT8D-200 series engine fan hub tierod and stress redistribution holes by means of FPI and eddy current by a fixed number of flight cycles based on the risk of crack propagation from manufacturing flaws. (Superseded by A-98-19 and A-98-20) (Closed - Unacceptable Action/Superseded) |
| Issued: 29-JUL-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-076 |
| REVIEW & MODIFY THE PROCESSES AS NECESSARY BY WHICH VOLVO & PRATT & WHITNEY PERMITTED JT8D-200 SERIES FAN HUBS TO BE PLACED IN AIRLINE SERVICE FOLLOWING INDICATIONS OF MECHANICAL DAMAGE IN THE TIEROD HOLES BASED ON A BLUE ETCH ANODIZE INSPECTION. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 29-JUL-1996 | To: FAA | A-96-077 |
| REVIEW & REVISE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ENGINE MANUFACTURERS & AIR CARRIERS, THE PROCEDURES, TRAINING THAT INCLUDES THE SYLLABI & VISUAL AIDS, & SUPERVISION PROVIDED TO INSPECTORS FOR PERFORMING FPI & OTHER NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING OF HIGH ENERGY ROTATING ENGINE PARTS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE JT8D-200 SERIES TIEROD & STRESS REDISTRIBUTION HOLES. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-009 |
| FORM A TASK FORCE TO EVALUATE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE BLUE ETCH ANODIZE & OTHER POSTMANUFACTURING ETCH PROCESSES & DEVELOP WAYS TO IMPROVE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ABNORMAL MICROSTRUCTURE WILL BE DETECTED. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-010 |
| INFORM ALL MANUFACTURERS OF TITANIUM ROTATING ENGINE COMPONENTS OF THE POTENTIAL THAT CURRENT BORING & HONING SPECIFICATIONS MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO REMOVE POTENTIAL DEFECTS FROM HOLES & ASK THEM TO REEVALUATE THEIR MANUFACTURING SPECIFICATIONS & PROCEDURES WITH THIS IN MIND. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-011 |
| ESTABLISH & REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO A UNIFORM SET OF STANDARDS FOR MATERIALS & PROCEDURES USED IN THE CLEANING, DRYING, PROCESSING, & HANDLING OF PARTS IN THE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION PROCESS. IN ESTABLISHING THOSE STANDARDS, THE FAA SHOULD DO THE FOLLOWING (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-012 |
| ESTABLISH & REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO A UNIFORM SET OF STANDARDS FOR MATERIALS & PROCEDURES IN THE CLEANING, DRYING PROCESSING, & HANDLING OF PARTS IN THE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT IN SPECTION PROCESS. IN ESTABLISHING THOSE STANDARDS, THE FAA SHOULD DO THE FOLLOWING (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-013 |
| ESTABLISH & REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO A UNIFORM SET OF STANDARDS OF MATERIALS & PROCEDURES USED IN THE CLEANING, DRYING, PROCESSING, & HANDLING OF PARTS IN THE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION PROCESS. IN ESTABLISHING THOSE STANDARDS, THE FAA SHOULD DO THE FOLLOWING (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-014 |
| ESTABLISH & REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO A UNIFORM SET OF STANDARDS FOR MATERIALS & PROCEDURES USED IN THE CLEANING, DRYING, PROCESSING, & HANDLING OF PARTS IN THE FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION PROCESS. IN ESTABLISHING THOSE STANDARDS, THE FAA SHOULD DO THE FOLLOWING. ADDRESS THE NEED FOR A FORMAL SYSTEM TO TRACK & CONTROL DEVELOPMENT TIMES. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-015 |
| ESTABLISH & REQUIRE ADHERENCE TO A UNIFORM SET OF STANDARDS FOR MATERIALS & PROCEDURES USED IN THE CLEANING, DRYING, PROCESSING, & HANDLING OF PARTS IN THE FLOURESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION PROCESS. IN ESTABLISHING THOSE STANDARDS, THE FAA SHOULD DO THE FOLLOWING (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-016 |
| REQUIRE THE DEVELOPMENT OF METHODS FOR INSPECTORS TO NOTE ON THE PART OR OTHERWISE DOCUMENT DURING A NONDESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION THE PORTIONS OF A CRITICAL ROTATING PART THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN INSPECTED & RECEIVED DIAGNOSTIC FOLLOWUP TO ENSURE THE COMPLETE INSPECTION OF THE PART. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-017 |
| CONDUCT RESEARCH TO DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME AN INSPECTOR CAN PERFORM NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING INSPECTIONS BEFORE HUMAN PERFORMANCE DECREMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-018 |
| IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDUSTRY & HUMAN FACTORS EXPERTS, DEVELOP TEST METHODS THAT CAN EVALUATE INSPECTOR SKILL IN VISUAL SEARCH & DETECTION ACROSS A REPRESENTATIVE RANGE OF TEST PIECES, & ENSURE PROFICIENCY EXAMINATIONS INCORPORATE THESE METHODS & ARE ADMINISTERED DURING INITIAL & RECURRENT TRAINING FOR INSPECTORS WORKING ON CRITICAL ROTATING PARTS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-019 |
| REQUIRE THAT ALL HEAVY ROTATING TITANIUM ENGINE COMPONENTS (INCLUDING THE JT8D-200 SERIES FAN HUBS) RECEIVE APPROPRIATE NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING INSPECTIONS (MULTIPLE INSPECTIONS, IF NEEDED) BASED ON PROBABILITY OF DETECTION DATA AT INTERVALS IN THE COMPONENT\'S SERVICE LIFE, SUCH THAT IF A CRACK EXISTS, BUT IS NOT DETECTED DURING THE FIRST INSPECTION, IT WILL RECEIVE A SECOND INSPECTION BEFORE IT CAN PROPAGATE TO FAILURE; ASSUMING THAT A CRACK MAY BEGIN TO PROPAGATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER BEING PUT INTO SERVICE, AS IT DID IN THE 7/6/96, ACCIDENT AT PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, & IN THE 7/19/89, UNITED AIRLINES ACCIDENT AT SIOUX CITY, IOWA. RECOMMENDATIONS A-96-74 & A-96-75 ARE SUPERSEDED BY A-98-19. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-020 |
| REQUIRE, AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, PENDING IMPLEMENTATION OF A-98-19, THAT CRITICAL ROTATING TITANIUM ENGINE COMPONENTS THAT HAVE BEEN IN SERVICE FOR AT LEAST 2 YEARS RECEIVE A FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION, EDDY CURRENT, & ULTRASONIC INSPECTION OF THE HIGH-STRESS AREAS AT THE ENGINE\'S NEXT SHOP VISIT OR WITHIN 2 YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION, WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST. RECOMMENDATIONS A-96-74 & A-96-75 ARE SUPERSEDED BY A-98-20. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-021 |
| REQUIRE DELTA AIR LINES TO REVIEW ITS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON NONMAINTENANCE STATIONS, TO ENSURE THAT FLIGHTCREWS HAVE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE ABOUT WHAT CONSTITUTES A MAINTENANCE IRREGULARITY OR DISCREPANCY (INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF FLUID DROPS IN UNUSUAL LOCATIONS) BEFORE DEPARTURE, & THAT FOLLOWING THIS REVIEW DELTA SHOULD, CONTINGENT ON FAA APPROVAL, AMEND ITS FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL TO CLARIFY UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES FLIGHTCREWS CAN, IF AT ALL, MAKE INDEPENDENT DETERMINATIONS TO DEPART WHEN MAINTENANCE IRREGULARITIES ARE NOTED. FURTHER, THE FAA SHOULD HAVE ITS PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS REVIEW THESE POLICES & PROCEDURES AT THEIR RESPECTIVE OPERATORS TO CLARIFY, IF NECESSARY, THESE FLIGHTCREW RESPONSIBILITIES. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-022 |
| REQUIRE THAT ALL NEWLY MANUFACTURED PASSENGER-CARRYING AIRPLANES OPERATED UNDER 14 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS PART 121 BE EQUIPPED WITH INDEPENDENTLY POWERED EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEMS OPERABLE FROM EACH CREWMEMBER STATION, & ESTABLISH PROCEDURES & PROVIDE TRAINING TO FLIGHT & CABIN CREWS REGARDING THE USE OF SUCH SYSTEMS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
| Issued: 04-MAR-1998 | To: FAA | A-98-023 |
| REQUIRE THAT ALL NEWLY MANUFACTURED AIRPLANES BE EQUIPPED WITH COCKPIT INDICATORS SHOWING OPEN EXITS, INCLUDING OVERWING EXIT HATCHES, & THAT THESE COCKPIT INDICATORS BE CONNECTED TO EMERGENCY POWER CIRCUITS. (Closed - Unacceptable Action) |
