Détails:
Iberia flight 6463, performed by an Airbus A340-600, was a regular service from Madrid, Spain to Quito and Guayaquil in Ecuador. The crew contacted Quito Approach at 16:50 and received descent instructions in preparation for an instrument approach no. 4 (VOR QIT DME/ILS) for runway 35. During the descent the crew were notified that preceding flights had reported braking action medium to poor. The flight crew selected auto braking to 'High'.
At 17:05, the crew reported the runway in sight, after which the controller stated that the wind was 170° with 04 knots, the runway was wet and reported braking action was poor. The flight was cleared to land.
The pilot in command, following the procedures established by Iberia, decided to leave the ILS glide path and captured the path of the PAPI lights. The aircraft touched down 200 m past the threshold at a 3.09g side load.
The spoilers deployed automatically and main gear tyres 3 and 8 blew. The flap lever was moved involuntarily by the copilot, from the full position to position 2.
The crew applied full manual braking and select reverse thrust. The Auto Brake function failed, after which the crew disconnected the antiskid braking system and continued to apply manual braking.
The aircraft passed the end of runway 35, with a ground speed of 90 knots, hit the ILS localizer and stopped 232 meters further. Passengers and crew were evacuated using the slide at door 2R, thirty minutes after the aircraft stopped.
The aircraft was recovered, but it was considered too difficult to repair the aircraft at Quito. It was broken up in May 2008.
PROBABLE CAUSE (translated from the original Spanish text):
The Board of Inquiry finds that the probable cause of this event was the decision of the crew to initiate and carry out the approach to the airport in Quito, with the known facts of the state of the runway, weather conditions and aircraft weight and not to abandon the approach, forcing the capture of the path of PAPI beyond the parameters of stabilization.
Issues determined to make a hard landing that damaged important parts of the aircraft that made it impossible to stop on the track.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
The following events contributed to the occurrence :
- On the date of the incident, the crew did not have specific regulations and operating procedures (the briefing of the operator for the airport in Quito was inappropriate to the real conditions).
- The fact that the crew still being experienced similar airports in Quito and had not experienced similar weather situations, circumstances that would have allowed a strategy of approximation consistent with the terms of this operation, in particular as regards:
- Calculations in flight for landing runway length
- Minimum altitude to start the maneuver of changing the path of ILS to PAPI
- Carrying out a very detailed briefing that allowed unwanted deviations on approach.
- The weather conditions existing at the time of landing (visibility, tail wind and moderate rain).
» Iberia Press release 10-11-2007
accident date: 09-11-2007
type: Airbus A340-642
registration: EC-JOH
| Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | vendredi 9 novembre 2007 |
| Heure: | 17:06 |
| Type/Sous-type: |  Airbus A340-642 |
| Compagnie: | Iberia |
| Immatriculation: | EC-JOH |
| Numéro de série: | 731 |
| Année de Fabrication: | 2006 |
| Heures de vol: | 8704 |
| Cycles: | 965 |
| Moteurs: | 4 Rolls-Royce Trent 556A2-61 |
| Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 14 |
| Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 345 |
| Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 359 |
| Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
| Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Lieu de l'accident: | Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport (UIO) ( Equateur)
|
| Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
| Nature: | Transport de Passagers Intern. |
| Aéroport de départ: | Madrid-Barajas Airport (MAD/LEMD), Espagne |
| Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport (UIO/SEQU), Equateur | |
| Numéro de vol: | IB6463 |
Iberia flight 6463, performed by an Airbus A340-600, was a regular service from Madrid, Spain to Quito and Guayaquil in Ecuador. The crew contacted Quito Approach at 16:50 and received descent instructions in preparation for an instrument approach no. 4 (VOR QIT DME/ILS) for runway 35. During the descent the crew were notified that preceding flights had reported braking action medium to poor. The flight crew selected auto braking to 'High'.
At 17:05, the crew reported the runway in sight, after which the controller stated that the wind was 170° with 04 knots, the runway was wet and reported braking action was poor. The flight was cleared to land.
The pilot in command, following the procedures established by Iberia, decided to leave the ILS glide path and captured the path of the PAPI lights. The aircraft touched down 200 m past the threshold at a 3.09g side load.
The spoilers deployed automatically and main gear tyres 3 and 8 blew. The flap lever was moved involuntarily by the copilot, from the full position to position 2.
The crew applied full manual braking and select reverse thrust. The Auto Brake function failed, after which the crew disconnected the antiskid braking system and continued to apply manual braking.
The aircraft passed the end of runway 35, with a ground speed of 90 knots, hit the ILS localizer and stopped 232 meters further. Passengers and crew were evacuated using the slide at door 2R, thirty minutes after the aircraft stopped.
The aircraft was recovered, but it was considered too difficult to repair the aircraft at Quito. It was broken up in May 2008.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE (translated from the original Spanish text):
The Board of Inquiry finds that the probable cause of this event was the decision of the crew to initiate and carry out the approach to the airport in Quito, with the known facts of the state of the runway, weather conditions and aircraft weight and not to abandon the approach, forcing the capture of the path of PAPI beyond the parameters of stabilization.
Issues determined to make a hard landing that damaged important parts of the aircraft that made it impossible to stop on the track.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
The following events contributed to the occurrence :
- On the date of the incident, the crew did not have specific regulations and operating procedures (the briefing of the operator for the airport in Quito was inappropriate to the real conditions).
- The fact that the crew still being experienced similar airports in Quito and had not experienced similar weather situations, circumstances that would have allowed a strategy of approximation consistent with the terms of this operation, in particular as regards:
- Calculations in flight for landing runway length
- Minimum altitude to start the maneuver of changing the path of ILS to PAPI
- Carrying out a very detailed briefing that allowed unwanted deviations on approach.
- The weather conditions existing at the time of landing (visibility, tail wind and moderate rain).
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
» El Comercio» Iberia Press release 10-11-2007
Photos
accident date: 09-11-2007
type: Airbus A340-642
registration: EC-JOH
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Madrid-Barajas Airport et Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport est de 8689 km (5431 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
La distance entre Madrid-Barajas Airport et Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport est de 8689 km (5431 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
languages: 
Equateur
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