Narrative:The Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 jet departed Kortrijk-Wevelgem International Airport (KJK), Belgium at 07:38 hours local time on a flight to Berlin-Schönefeld Airport (SXF), Germany. The copilot was Pilot Flying, the Pilot in Command (PIC) was Pilot Monitoring.
While en route at FL390 the flight crew listened out the ATIS frequency for Berlin-Schönefeld, but they failed to hear any airport information.
After commencing the descent, the flight was cleared for an ILS approach to runway 07L at Berlin-Schönefeld. When passing FL200 in the descent, the Pilot Flying wanted to start the descent checklist, but the Pilot Monitoring wanted to fully listen out the ATIS which was now being received. The ATIS among others stated: "[...] moderate icing reported below 3 000 feet [...]".
At 08:51 the Pilot Monitoring stated that the temperature was not below zero Celsius and that he wanted to wait before switching on the anti-ice systems. Four minutes later he switched on the Engine Anti-Ice System as temperature had dropped below zero.
At 08:57 the flight was cleared to land on runway 07L. When working the Approach checklist, the Pilot Monitoring at the "icing conditions" item stated that "it is still on".
The aircraft was subsequently configured for the final approach and the autopilot was disconnected. The PIC stated that they had visual contact with the runway and that 'everything could be switched off'. He proceeded to switch off the Engine Anti-Ice and Windshield Anti-Ice Systems.
As the aircraft was flared over the threshold, the left wing dropped and contacted the runway. The aircraft then rolled right and touched down hard on the right hand main landing gear. The gear leg broke and the aircraft slid along the side of the runway until coming to a stop 447 meters past the runway threshold.
A few minutes after the accident, officials noted that a 10 mm layer of ice had accumulated on the aircraft nose, wing leading edge, undercarriage and stabilizer.
The PIC stated after the accident that he had not seen any ice accretion on the outer third of the wing and decided not to use the Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer De-Ice System. Activating this system would also have reduced aircraft performance.
Probable Cause:
Causes (translated from German):
The aircraft accident is attributable to the following causes:
- The crew performed the approach under known icing conditions and did not switch on the Wing and Horizontal Stabilizer De-Ice System, contrary to the standard operating procedures (SOP).
- During the flare the aircraft entered a stall due to ice build-up on the wings and tail unit and the fact that the speed fell below the approach speed prescribed for icing conditions, and fell off to the side.
Contributing factor:
- The crew had insufficient knowledge regarding the relationship between the Ice Protection System and the Stall Warning Protection System (SWPS).
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | BFU Germany  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 5 years and 10 months | Accident number: | BFU CX001-13 | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Classification:
Icing
Heavy landing
Runway mishap
Sources:
» BFU CX001-13
Follow-up / safety actions
BFU issued 4 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: EASA | 10/2018 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), in cooperation with the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC), should ensure that the aircraft manufacturer of type EMB-500 specifies the syllabus for obtaining type rating in such a way that pilots clearly understand the meaning, function and operation of the Ice Protection and Stall Warning Protection systems for type EMB-500. |
Issued: -- | To: ANAC | 11/2018 |
The Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC), in cooperation with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), should ensure that the aircraft manufacturer of type EMB-500 specifies the syllabus for obtaining type rating in such a way that pilots clearly understand the meaning, function and operation of the Ice Protection and Stall Warning Protection systems for type EMB-500. |
Issued: -- | To: DFS | 12/2018 |
German air navigation services (DFS) should ensure that the allocation of a final approach speed takes into account the approach category of the aircraft and the safety gates to be observed by pilots as well as the staggering requirements. For this purpose, the Operating Instructions for Air Traffic Services (BA-FVD) should be supplemented as follows: Before assigning a speed, the pilot should be asked what speed can be maintained up to what distance from the touchdown point. Single engine propeller aeroplanes in final approach should not be assigned velocities after initiation of descent. |
Issued: -- | To: CAA Belgium | 9/2018 |
The Belgian aeronautical authority, Directorat-General de l\'Aviation Civile, should ensure, as part of its oversight, that air carriers take appropriate measures to ensure consistent compliance with the standard operating procedures and the application of the criteria for a stabilised approach. |
Show all...
Photos

accident date:
15-02-2013type: Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
registration: OO-MAS
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Kortrijk-Wevelgem International Airport to Berlin-Schönefeld Airport as the crow flies is 728 km (455 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.