ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 320788
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| Date: | Wednesday 27 March 2013 |
| Time: | 12:53 |
| Type: |  de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 |
| Owner/operator: | Air Labrador |
| Registration: | C-FOPN |
| MSN: | 291 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1970 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 10 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial, repaired |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | St. Anthony Airport, NL (YAY) -
 Canada
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Mary's Harbour Airport, NL (YMH/CYMH) |
| St. Anthony Airport, NL (YAY/CYAY) | |
| Investigating agency: | TSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On 27 March 2013, an Air Labrador Twin Otter was landing at St. Anthony Airport, with 2 crew members and 8 passengers on board. On approach to runway 10, the captain and first officer discussed approach and landing considerations due to the strong crosswinds, and it was decided that the first officer would continue the approach. Immediately prior to landing, the first officer experienced difficulty, so control of the aircraft was transferred to the captain. The transfer of control was completed less than 2 seconds prior to landing. The aircraft touched down on the left main wheel, bounced, and landed hard on the nosewheel; the nose landing gear collapsed due to overstress failures. Directional control was lost, and the aircraft skidded on its nose and came to rest 96 feet off the north side of the runway. There were no injuries, and the aircraft was substantially damaged.
The investigation determined that, when control of the aircraft was passed to the captain, there was insufficient time to position the aircraft for a successful landing due to the substantial crosswind. The Air Labrador Twin Otter standard operating procedures (SOPs) do not state when the captain should permit the first officer to act as pilot flying or relieve the first officer from that role. When allowing the first officer to fly in challenging conditions, the captain must be prepared to take control of the aircraft in adequate time to ensure the safety of the flight. Also, there is an increased risk of a landing accident if a required briefing is not conducted. Crew members may not share a common plan for the approach and landing, and, as in this case, transfer of control may not be conducted in a timely manner.
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The captain permitted the first officer to continue with a challenging approach.
2. Control of the aircraft was passed to the captain with insufficient time to position the aircraft for a successful landing.
3. The aircraft landed hard, resulting in the collapse of the nose gear due to overstress failures.
Findings as to risk:
1. If a required briefing is not conducted, the crew members may not share a common plan for the approach and landing, and the transfer of control may not be completed in a timely manner, increasing the risk of a landing accident.
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
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Revision history:
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