Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Saturday 13 April 2013 |
Time: | 15:10 |
Type: |  Boeing 737-8GP (WL) |
Operator: | Lion Air |
Registration: | PK-LKS |
MSN: | 38728/4350 |
First flight: | 2013-02-05 (2 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 142 |
Cycles: | 104 |
Engines: | 2 CFMI CFM56-7B24E |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 7 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 101 |
Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 108 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Bali International Airport (DPS) ( Indonesia)
|
Phase: | Approach (APR) |
Nature: | Domestic Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Bandung Airport (BDO/WICC), Indonesia |
Destination airport: | Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Bali International Airport (DPS/WADD), Indonesia |
Flightnumber: | 904 |
Narrative:A Boeing 737-800 passenger plane, registered PK-LKS, suffered an accident at Bali's Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Bali International Airport (DPS) in Indonesia. There were 101 passengers and seven crew members on board. All aboard survived.
Flight JT-904 departed originated at Palu Airport (PLW), Indonesia and was bound for Denpasar (DPS), Indonesia with en route stops at Balikpapan Airport (BPN), Banjarmasin Airport (BDJ) and Bandung Airport (BDO).
The flight departed Bandung at 13:45 with the copilot as Pilot Flying. About 15:00 the flight was descending towards Bali and the crew received vectors for a VOR DME approach for runway 09. At 15:08, with the aircraft at approximately 1,600 ft AGL, the Tower controller saw the aircraft on finals and gave a landing clearance with additional information that the wind condition was 120° at 5 kts.
While descending through 900 feet the copilot stated that the runway was not in sight. Since the captain noted a flashing light at the beginning of the runway, he responded: "OK. Approach light in sight, continue". At 15:09:33, after the EGPWS called out "Minimum" at an altitude of approximately 550 ft AGL, the pilot disengaged the autopilot and the auto throttle and continued the descent. The airplane then entered an area of rainfall and the outside environment became totally dark.
At 150 ft AGL the captain took over control. The copilot handed the control to the captain and stated that he could not see the runway. At 15:10:01, the EGPWS called out "Twenty", and the captain commanded a go around. One second later the aircraft impacted the water.
The aircraft stopped facing to the north at about 20 meters from the shore or approximately 300 meters south west of the beginning runway 09.
Probable Cause:
Contributing Factors:
- The aircraft flight path became unstable below minimum descends altitude (MDA) with the rate of descend exceeding 1000 feet per minute and this situation was recognized by both pilots.
- The flight crew loss of situational awareness in regards of visual references once the aircraft entered a rain cloud during the final approach below minimum descends altitude (MDA).
- The PIC decision and execution to go-around was conducted at an altitude which was insufficient for the go-around to be executed successfully.
- The pilots of accident aircraft was not provided with timely and accurate weather condition despite the weather around the airport and particularly on final approach to the airport was changing rapidly.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSC Indonesia  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 5 months | Accident number: | KNKT.13.04.09.04 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Undershoot/overshoot
Sources:
»
SKYbrary
METAR Weather report:
07:00 UTC / 15:00 local time:
WADD 130700Z 09006KT 9999 BKN017 30/26 Q1007 NOSIG07:30 UTC / 15:30 local time:
WADD 130730Z 15006KT 110V270 9999 FEW017CB SCT017 30/25 Q1007 NOSIGWind 150°, varying between 110 and 270° at 6 knots; unlimited visibility; few Cumulonimbus clouds at 1700 feet AGL; scattered clouds at 1700 feet AGL; Temperature: 30°C; Dewpoint: 25°C; Pressure: 1007 mb
08:00 UTC / 16:00 local time:
WADD 130800Z 10009KT 9999 FEW017CB SCT017 30/26 Q1007 NOSIG
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSC issued 14 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: AirNav Indonesia | 04.A.2014.9.1 |
The ATIS information of the visibility was 10 km contrary to the actual condition that the pilots could not see the runway. Considered to this finding KNKT recommends that the AirNav Indonesia should adjust the airport operation according to the current firefighting and rescue category, declared by airport authority (CLOSED) |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: Bali Airport operator (AngkasaPura) | 04.B.2014.9.1 |
In regard to the actual time of the ARFF arrival at the accident site and the ICAO Annex 14 Para 9.2.23 recommended response time indicated that the actual response time performed by the ARFF was 4 minutes instead of 3 minutes after the crash bell pressed by controller. Following to this finding the PT Angkasa Pura I requires to evaluate the ARFF response time capability based on the involvement of the ARFF Ngurah Rai to this rescue operation (CLOSED) |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: Bali Airport operator (AngkasaPura) | 04.B.2014.9.2 |
While foam tender(s) absence from the fire station, the requirement of ICAO for the response time and firefighting category should be complied therefore requires specific strategy. If the response time could not be achieved, the airport operation should be reduce or stop for evaluating purposes. (CLOSED) |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: BMKG (meteo) | 04.L.2014.9.1 |
The ICAO Annex 3 4.6, Observing and reporting of visibility, should be implemented |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: BMKG (meteo) | 04.L.2014.9.2 |
The BMKG and AP I should evaluate the current information distribution system to ensure the latest weather information distributes to the pilots representing the ICAO Recommendation |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: Lion Air | 04.O.2014.9.1 |
The operator should ensure that all pilots must be competent in hand flying and covered during pilot initial and recurrent training program |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: Lion Air | 04.O.2014.9.2 |
The operator should emphasize and ensure pilot monitoring skills are embedded in the pilot training program and SOP |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: Lion Air | 04.O.2014.9.3 |
The operator should review and ensure the effectiveness of current CRM training program and CRM practices. |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: Lion Air | 04.O.2014.9.4 |
The operator should review and ensure the effectiveness of current Safety Emergency Procedure particularly evacuation procedure. |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: DGCA Indonesia | 04.R.2014.9.1 |
The DGCA should oversight all air operators in achieving the effectiveness of training programs for the pilots to be competent in hand flying and covered during pilot initial training and recurrent program. |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: DGCA Indonesia | 04.R.2014.9.2 |
The DGCA should oversight all air operators to ensure pilot monitoring skills are embedded in the pilot training program and SOP |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: DGCA Indonesia | 04.R.2014.9.3 |
The DGCA should oversight all air operators to ensure the effectiveness of current CRM training program and CRM practices |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: DGCA Indonesia | 04.R.2014.9.4 |
The DGCA should oversight all air operators in reviewing the effectiveness of current Safety Emergency Procedure particularly evacuation procedure |
Issued: 01-SEP-2014 | To: DGCA Indonesia | 04.R.2014.9.5 |
The DGCA should oversight the ARFF response time capability, including in the case of the firefighting and rescue category downgraded due to firefighting and rescue activities |
Show all...
Photos

accident date:
13-04-2013type: Boeing 737-8GP (WL)
registration: PK-LKS
Video, social media
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Bandung Airport to Denpasar-Ngurah Rai Bali International Airport as the crow flies is 857 km (536 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.