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Last updated: 3 December 2021
Status:Definitief
Datum:woensdag 2 oktober 1996
Tijd:01:11
Type:Silhouette image of generic B752 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Boeing 757-23A
Luchtvaartmaatschappij:AeroPeru
Registratie: N52AW
Constructienummer: 25489/505
Bouwjaar: 1992-11-16 (3 years 11 months)
Aantal vlieguren:10654
Aantal vluchten:2673
Motoren: 2 Pratt & Whitney PW2037
Bemanning:slachtoffers: 9 / inzittenden: 9
Passagiers:slachtoffers: 61 / inzittenden: 61
Totaal:slachtoffers: 70 / inzittenden: 70
Schade: Vernield
Gevolgen: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Plaats:89 km (55.6 mijl) NW van Lima, Peru (   Grote Oceaan)
Fase: Kruisvlucht (ENR)
Soort vlucht:Internationale lijnvlucht
Vliegveld van vertrek:Lima-Jorge Chávez International Airport (LIM/SPIM), Peru
Vliegveld van aankomst:Santiago-Arturo Merino Benitez Airport (SCL/SCEL), Chili
Vluchtnummer:PL603
Beschrijving:
AeroPeru Flight 603, a Boeing 757-200, crashed into the sea off Lima, Peru, killing all 70 occupants.
The aircraft performed a regular passenger service from Lima, Peru to Santiago, Chile. The flight took off from runway 15 at Lima Airport at 00:42 hours local time (05:42 UTC).
While climbing through an altitude of approximately 200-300 ft, the pilots noted that the airspeed and altitude indications were too low. In calm winds, the windshear warning suddenly sounded three times. The flight crew then declared an emergency.
The crew also started to receive rudder ratio and mach speed trim warnings, which were repeated throughout the flight, distracting their attention and adding to the problem of multiple alarms and warnings which saturated and bewildered them, creating confusion and chaos.
At 00:53 the flight contacted the Departure controller again, eight minutes after the initial call, reporting they "request vectors from now on". By then the aircraft had climbed over sea and the flight crew were attempting to turn back, while trying to manage all conflicting warnings.
At 00:55:07, the crew radioed: "You're going to have to help us with altitudes and speed if that's possible." And from that moment until the end, the stick shaker, overspeed and "too low – terrain" alarms began to sound.
This caused confusion and the copilot said to the captain: "...right now we're stalling." The captain disagreed: "we're not stalling. it's fictitious, it's fictitious". Referring to the stick shaker, the copilot replies "... how can we not be stalling?".
At 01:04 the flight crew was attempting to maintain 4000 feet, however one minute later they start a measured and continuous descent. The aircraft kept descending and impacted the water with the left wing and no. 1 engine at a 10 degrees angle, at a speed of 260 knots. The aircraft pulled up to about 300 feet and flew for another 17 seconds. It then rolled inverted and crashed. The captain's airspeed indicated 450 knots and altitude 9500 feet.

Investigation results showed that the aircraft's three static ports on the left side were obstructed by masking tape. The tape had been applied before washing and polishing of the aircraft prior to the accident flight.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE PRINCIPAL CAUSE :

ERROR OF THE MAINTENANCE STAFF INCLUDING THE CREW
It can be deduced from the investigation carried out that the maintenance staff did not remove the protective adhesive tape from the static ports. This tape was not detected during the various phases of the aircraft's release to the line mechanic, its transfer to the passenger boarding apron and, lastly, the inspection by the crew responsible for the flight (the walk-around or pre-flight check), which was carried out by the pilot-in-command, [name], according to the mechanic responsible for the aircraft on the day of the accident.

CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
b.1) PERSONAL ERROR OF THE CREW
The pilot-in-command, Mr [name], made a personal error by not complying with the procedure for GPWS alarms and not noticing the readings of the radio altimeters in order to discard everything which he believed to be fictitious.
b.2) PERSONAL ERROR INCLUDING THE CREW

The co-pilot, Mr [name], made a personal error by not being more insistent, assertive and convincing in alerting the pilot-in-command much more emphatically to the ground proximity alarms.

Bronnen:
» SKYbrary 
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 2.12.96 (33)
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 7 October 1996 (21-22)
» Flight International 9-15 October 1996 (8)
» NTSB Safety Recommendation A-96-141
» Scramble 210


Veiligheidsmaatregelen

DGAT Peru issued 34 Safety Recommendations
NTSB issued 1 Safety Recommendation

Show all...

Foto's

photo of Boeing-757-23A-N52AW
photo of Boeing-757-23A-N52AW
accident date: 02-10-1996
type: Boeing 757-23A
registration: N52AW
photo of Boeing-757-23A-N52AW
accident date: 02-10-1996
type: Boeing 757-23A
registration: N52AW
 

Kaart
Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Lima-Jorge Chávez International Airport en Santiago-Arturo Merino Benitez Airport bedraagt 2452 km (1532 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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Boeing 757

  • 1050 built
  • 4e ongeval
  • 4e dodelijk ongeval
  • 3e zwaarste ongeval (toen het plaatsvond)
  • 4e zwaarste ongeval (op dit moment)
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 Grote Oceaan
  • 4e zwaarste ongeval (toen het plaatsvond)
  • 5e zwaarste ongeval (op dit moment)
» safety profile