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Last updated: 25 October 2021
Date:Monday 21 February 2005
Type:Silhouette image of generic H25A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Hawker Siddeley HS-125-600A
Operator:Scott Aviation
Registration: N21SA
MSN: 256006
First flight: 1973
Engines: 2 Garrett TFE731-3-1H
Crew:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Passengers:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4
Total:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:Bromont Airport, QC (ZBM) (   Canada)
Phase: Landing (LDG)
Departure airport:Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, QC (YUL/CYUL), Canada
Destination airport:Bromont Airport, QC (ZBM/CZBM), Canada
The aircraft took off from Montréal (YUL) at 17:56 for a night IFR flight to Bromont Airport, QC (ZBM). Approximately nine minutes before the landing, the co-pilot activated the aircraft radio control of aerodrome lighting (ARCAL) and contacted the approach UNICOM at Bromont. The Bromont Airport dispatcher informed the crew that only the PAPI was operational. A NOTAM had been issued on 17 February 2005, indicating that the runway edge lights would be out of order until 22:00 UTC, 22 February 2005. The PAPI and the approach lights lit up when the co-pilot activated the ARCAL, because their switches had been left on. At approximately 1000 feet (300 m) asl and five miles (8 km) from the threshold, the flight crew had the approach lights and the PAPI in sight. It was not evident whether the PAPI was positioned on the right or the left side of the runway. The airport chart published by Jeppesen indicated "PAPI L" (left). In response to a query from the crew, the Bromont dispatcher indicated that the PAPI was on the right side of the runway. From his location facing the aircraft, the PAPI was to the dispatcher's right. The approach was continued visually, keeping to the left of the PAPI. At approximately two miles (3,2 km) from the runway threshold, the co-pilot noticed that the approach lights were at his right. He reported his observation to the captain, who paid little attention to it. Less than two seconds before the crash, the co-pilot asked the captain whether he had the runway in sight. The captain did not reply and continued the descent until the aircraft touched down 300 feet (90 m) to the left of runway 05L, 1800 feet (550 m) beyond the threshold. When the captain realized that he was not on the runway, he applied full power to execute a missed approach; however, the aircraft hit a ditch approximately four feet (1,20 m) deep that was perpendicular to the flight path. The nose wheel and right landing gear collapsed. The aircraft came to a stop facing back the way it had come, after travelling a distance of 1800 feet during which it made a full turn followed by a 180-degree turn.

Probable Cause:

1. The flight crew attempted a night landing in the absence of runway edge lights. The aircraft touched down 300 feet to the left of Runway 05L and 1800 feet beyond the threshold.
2. The runway was not closed for night use despite the absence of runway edge lights. Nothing required it to be closed.
3. Poor flight planning, non-compliance with regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs), and the lack of communications between the two pilots reveal a lack of airmanship on the part of the crew, which contributed to the accident.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: TSB Canada
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 2 months
Accident number: A05Q0024
Download report: Final report

Runway excursion

» TSB Report Number A05Q0024


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This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, QC to Bromont Airport, QC as the crow flies is 80 km (50 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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