Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Wednesday 29 November 2006 |
Time: | 13:15 |
Type: | Grob G.180A SPn |
Operator: | Grob Aerospace |
Registration: | D-CGSP |
MSN: | 90002 |
First flight: | 2006-09-29 (2 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 28 |
Cycles: | 40 |
Engines: | 2 Williams International FJ44-3A |
Crew: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
Total: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | 1,4 km (0.9 mls) ESE of Mindelheim-Mattsies Airport ( Germany)
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Phase: | Maneuvering (MNV) |
Nature: | Demonstration |
Departure airport: | Mindelheim-Mattsies Airfield (EDMN), Germany |
Destination airport: | Mindelheim-Mattsies Airfield (EDMN), Germany |
Narrative:The second prototype of the Grob SPn business jet was destroyed in an accident near Mindelheim-Mattsies Airport, Germany. Chief test pilot Gerard Guillaumaud was killed in the accident.
On the day of the accident, November 29, 2006, the airplane had conducted a 60-minute test flight from the factory airfield of manufacturer, Mindelheim-Mattsies Airport. Various flight maneuvers and system tests were completed and the airplane landed at 11:40. The aircraft was parked on the apron and prepared for the next flight.
This flight would be a demonstration flight for a group of visitors with several fly-bys. The jet took off from runway 33 at 13:12 and the pilot flew a right hand circuit in and out of clouds. As it was lining up for a fly-by parts from the stabilizer separated. The pilot lost control and the airplane impacted a field.
Given the weather circumstances, the flight should have been conducted using Reduced Flight Display specifications. These included a maximum speed of 200 knots. The probable speed of the accident airplane was between 240 and 270 knots. This speed was below the maximum allowed speed for flutter tests, 297 kts.
The manufacturer had changed the design of the control surfaces on this second prototype due to anti-icing requirements and to provide more roll authority.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: The accident occurred because there was an in-flight separation of the tailplane due to flutter and the plane subsequently was no longer controllable. The circumstances that led to the flutter could not be determined clearly due to lack of flight data and limited investigation.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | BFU Germany |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years and 5 months | Accident number: | BFU 3X181-0/06 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Tail failure
Loss of control
Sources:
» Grob Aerospace press release
» Structural failure eyed in Grob crash (Aviation International News, Jan 2007)
Follow-up / safety actions
BFU issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 23-APR-2010 | To: Grob | 12/2010 |
If the project be continued, the owners of the construction drawings, documentation and certificates of compliance required for Type Certification of the Grob G 180A aircraft should thoroughly scrutinise the design, construction and technical arrangements of the horizontal stabilizer with respect to aerodynamic efficacy, strength and absence of flutter, and redesign as necessary. |
Issued: 23-APR-2010 | To: LBA | 13/2010 |
The Federal German Civil Aviation Authority (LBA) should require that aircraft with a maximum take off weight (MTOW) of more than 5 700 kg and having a Permit to Fly for the purposes of test flying, should require installation of a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR); in place of which an uninterrupted telemetric flight data link would be acceptable. |
Issued: 23-APR-2010 | To: EASA | 14/2010 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) should ensure that aircraft with a maximum take off weight (MTOW) of more than 5,700 kg will be fitted with a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) during the entire flight test programme leading to Type Certification and during demonstration flights. In lieu of which, the uninterrupted transmission of flight data via telemetry is acceptable. |
Issued: 23-APR-2010 | To: EASA | 15/2010 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and other National Civil Aviation Authorities should check and monitor the integration of sub-contractors in design organisations engaged in the design and construction of aircraft as described in EASA Part 21, 21A.239, and regulate as necessary. |
Issued: 23-APR-2010 | To: ICAO | 18/2009 |
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) should require in Appendix 6, Parts II and III, or in Appendix 10 part III, that 406-MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT) for aircraft should have a supplementary internal antenna; or that the external antenna is, if possible, so designed as to ensure continued transmission of the emergency signal after an aircraft accident. |
Issued: 23-APR-2010 | To: EASA | 19/2009 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should ensure that new installations or retro-fitted 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT) used in aircraft are all designed and built with a supplementary internal antenna, or with an external antenna that will, if possible, ensure continued transmission after an aircraft accident. |
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accident date:
29-11-2006type: Grob G.180A SPn
registration: D-CGSP
Map
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.