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| Date: | Friday 1 November 1996 |
| Time: | 11:21 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-3Q8 |
| Owner/operator: | British Midland Airways - BMA |
| Registration: | G-OBML |
| MSN: | 24300/1666 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 141 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Runway 27L, London Heathrow Airport, Hounslow, Middlesex -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
| Dublin Airport, Dublin, Ireland (DUB/EIDW) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Severe internal damage to No 2 engine on 1-11-1996 on take off from London Heathrow on a flight to Dublin. The aircraft was scheduled to operate from Heathrow to Dublin and back four times that day; the the mishap took place on the aircraft's third flight from Heathrow to Dublin. No injuries sustained by any of the 141 persons on board (8 crew plus 133 passengers). According to the following extract from the official AAIB report into the accident:
"On the third sector, [From Heathrow to Dublin] the aircraft was cleared for take off from Runway 27L at Heathrow with a surface wind of 270 degrees/12 knots,good visibility, no significant cloud, temperature +13 degrees C and QNH 1024 mb.
The take off was normal, but between 400 and 500 feet in the initial climb the flight crew heard a very loud 'bang' from the No 2 engine. The aircraft began to yaw and roll to the right, but this was quickly controlled by the commander who was the handling pilot for the sector. He observed that the engine (fan) speed indication for the No. 2 engine was reducing rapidly and that the corresponding exhaust gas temperate (EGT) indication was in excess of 900°C, with the associated red warning light illuminated. There was no engine fire warning indication.
At this stage, the aircraft was still within the boundaries of the airport and the event had been observed by the crews of other aircraft and by several witnesses around the airport, all of whom noted that, for a brief period, flames and smoke had appeared from the rear of the No 2 engine.
This information was transmitted to the aircraft by ATC and the commander issued a MAYDAY advising of the engine failure. The aircraft climbed straight ahead to 2,000 feet initially while the recall items of the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist were carried out.
An expeditious left-hand circuit was then flown for a visual approach to Runway 27R, while the appropriate checklist items were carried out from the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). After positioning the aircraft onto final approach at about 6 nautical miles, an uneventful Flap 15 degree single engine landing was carried out.
After landing, the aircraf tvacated the runway and stopped on an adjacent taxiway while the Airport Fire Service carried out an inspection of the aircraft to confirm that there was no fire present. The aircraft then taxied to a parking stand and the passengers disembarked normally."
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
1. AAIB: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f1cee5274a1314000397/dft_avsafety_pdf_500093.pdf
2. https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/Boeing/737/24300/PK-MDQ-Merpati
3. http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b737-24300.htm
Media:
Boeing 737-300 TC-FLH (ex-G-OBML) at Stuttgart Echterdingen (STR/EDDS), Germany 30-8-2005:
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 16-Jun-2016 23:15 | Dr.John Smith | Added |
| 16-Jun-2016 23:16 | Dr.John Smith | Updated [Narrative] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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