ASN logo
ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 196643
Last updated: 2 December 2021
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Time:19:07 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic B738 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Boeing 737-8JP (WL)
Registration: LN-NHF
MSN: 42075/5470
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 174
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK) -   Finland
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Stockholm-Arlanda Airport (ARN/ESSA)
Destination airport:Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK)
Investigating agency: AIB Finland
Flight NAX4287 operated by Norwegian Air Shuttle departed from Arlanda Airport, Stockholm, on a service to Helsinki, Finland. The captain was pilot flying.
The en-route portion of the flight was normal. The flight crew assessed the landing distance for the prevailing conditions and conducted a briefing on the essential aspects of the approach. The assessment of the landing distance was based on an ATIS message in effect for the aerodrome. The aircraft left the cruise altitude at 18:46 to commence an ILS approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport. The initial approach to runway 04L was normal. Rain clouds were present in the area and winds were moderate.
The touchdown was light and slightly beyond the optimum touchdown point at an airspeed that was almost right for the prevailing conditions. The captain selected reverse thrust at the moment of the touchdown, and reverse thrust became effective three seconds after the touchdown. The speedbrakes (spoilers) had been armed, but due to the light touchdown they did not deploy automatically. The captain deployed the spoilers manually one second after the
touchdown. The autobrake system had also been armed and began to decelerate the aircraft normally upon spoiler deployment.
During the approach, the flight crew had planned to vacate the runway via high-speed turn-off WK. Due to the high speed, the captain elected to pass turn-off WK and vacate the runway via a taxiway at runway end. The captain canceled reverse thrust, and moments later also stowed the spoilers and deselected the autobrake system, which resulted in a marked reduction in the rate of deceleration. The captain applied light and full manual braking with approximately 850 and approximately 570 meters of runway remaining, respectively.
As the aircraft approached taxiway WH with approximately 300 m of runway remaining, the captain reselected reverse thrust and continued to apply heavy wheel braking. At this point, the aircraft was traveling at 64 kt (119 km/h). Because the captain had stowed the spoilers previously they did not deploy automatically. The captain attempted to steer the aircraft onto taxiway WD, which is the last taxiway at runway end. The captain canceled reverse thrust when the aircraft was traveling at approximately 25 kt (46 km/h), but due to excessive speed
was unable to turn the aircraft onto the taxiway. The first officer called “brace” via the passenger address system.
The tires impacted the runway light fixtures by the time aircraft heading had diverged approximately 20 degrees from runway 04L heading. Both nosewheels and three mainwheels came to rest on the grass while the fourth mainwheel remained on the paved area.
The captain elected to not evacuate the aircraft. The air traffic control declared a local standby phase, and aerodrome rescue service units secured the aircraft. The aircraft was moved off the grass by a pushback tractor and towed to a position in front of the terminal building.

1. The flight departed Stockholm for Helsinki 53 min behind schedule. It had already been late on arrival at Stockholm.
Conclusion: Competition and financial reasons, among other factors, have led airlines to set punctuality goals. A strive for punctuality or the minimizing of delays may contradict with safety aspects. If a punctuality goal cannot be met, attempts will be made to minimize the delay since each lost minute incurs additional costs.
2. Since the airplane was traveling at a high speed, the captain elected to pass high-speed turn-off WK. The flight crew aimed at vacating the runway via taxiway WD at the runway end. The distance to this taxiway intersection was approximately 1,200 m. The captain deselected the braking systems, and the aircraft continued down the runway at a speed that was high in view of the prevailing conditions and position.
Conclusion: Due to the possibility of other traffic and punctuality goals set for flights, flight crews attempt to vacate the runway as soon as possible.
3. Colored lights positioned along the runway provide information on the remaining runway. The captain initiated heavy braking too late and could not reduce speed sufficiently to turn the aircraft onto the taxiway. The captain did not anticipate the effects of the wet runway and stowed spoilers on the braking distance.
Conclusion: Flight crew members must maintain situational awareness until the very end of a flight.
4. Deficiencies in flight crew communication during the landing roll were noted.
Conclusion: Deficient communication may contribute to degraded situational awareness.
5. Flight crew actions and crew resource management during the landing roll were not in accordance with the company’s standard operating procedures.
Conclusion: Adherence to standard operating procedures is the cornerstone of safe flying.
6. The first officer had been recently hired by the company. The first officer did not explicitly indicate concern over the available runway. The first officer notified the cabin of an impending impact on own initiative.
Conclusion: Employees recently hired by organizations may hesitate to intervene in unexpected situations. Organizations should emphasize the importance of good crew resource management during all phases of the flight.
7. Speed during the overrun was low, and the incident did not cause injuries to persons.
Conclusion: Runway excursions rarely have catastrophic consequences.


Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: AIB Finland
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 11 months
Download report: Final report


Photo of LN-NHF courtesy

Helsinki - Vantaa (EFHK / HEL)
13 August 2018; (c) Pertti Sipilä

Revision history:

13-Jul-2017 17:37 gerard57 Added
13-Jul-2017 17:43 harro Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Location, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative]
26-Jul-2017 19:31 harro Updated [Source]
05-Aug-2018 14:59 harro Updated [Time, Total occupants, Damage, Narrative]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description