ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 207547
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| Date: | Wednesday 14 March 2018 |
| Time: | 23:48 LT |
| Type: |  Eurocopter EC 135P2+ |
| Owner/operator: | Heli-Aust Whitsundays / Aviator Group |
| Registration: | VH-ZGA |
| MSN: | 0777 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | 36.8 km NNW off Port Hedland Heliport, WA -
 Australia
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | Port Hedland Heliport (YHIP) |
| MV Squireship | |
| Investigating agency: | ATSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On the night of 14 March 2018, Heli-Aust Whitsundays Pty Ltd was operating a twin-engine EC 135P2+ helicopter, registered VH-ZGA, on a flight from its base at Port Hedland, Western Australia. This flight, conducted under the night visual flight rules, was to position the helicopter for a marine pilot transfer (MPT) from an outbound bulk carrier.
The pilot in command was a company instructor who was supervising line training with a recently recruited pilot. Earlier in their rostered shift, the pilot under supervision had passed a line check for day MPT and, having a total of 10 MPT flights, was approved for day operations. The instructor then introduced the pilot under supervision to night MPT operations and they completed 2 night MPT flights.
At 23:30 local time, the helicopter was lifted off and climbed on track to the outer markers of the shipping channel (C1/C2), about 39 km from the port. Although the weather was suitable for the flight, there was no moonlight, and artificial lighting in the vicinity of C1/C2 was limited. Consequently, the approach to the ship was conducted in a degraded visual cueing environment that increased the risk of disorientation.
From a cruise altitude of 1,600 ft, the pilot under supervision descended the helicopter to join a right circuit around the carrier at the specified circuit height of 700 ft. During the base segment the helicopter’s altitude started to increase, reaching 850 ft soon after completing the turn onto final at an airspeed of about 70 kt. Although the helicopter was higher than the target height of 500 ft, a consistent descent was not established, and the helicopter remained above the nominal descent profile.
When the helicopter was about 300 m from the landing hatch, it was descending through 500 ft at a rate of about 900 ft/min. At about this point, a go‑around was initiated, but the helicopter descended to about 300 ft before a positive climb rate was achieved.
The helicopter was turned downwind for another approach and subsequently reached 1,100 ft. A descent was then initiated without coupling a vertical navigation mode of the autopilot. This was not consistent with standard operational practices and significantly increased the attentional demands on both pilots and associated risk of deviation from circuit procedure.
During the downwind and base segment of the circuit, the pilots did not effectively monitor their flight instruments and the helicopter descended below the standard circuit profile at excessive rate with decaying airspeed. Neither pilot responded to the abnormal flight path or parameters until a radio altimeter alert at 300 ft.
The instructor responded to the radio altimeter alert, reducing the rate of descent from about 1,800 ft/min to 1,300 ft/min. This response was not consistent with an emergency go-around and did not optimise recovery before collision with water.
After the unexpected and significant water impact in dark conditions, the helicopter immediately rolled over, and the cabin submerged then flooded. The instructor escaped through an adjacent hole in the windscreen and used flotation devices until rescued; however, the pilot under supervision was unable to escape the cockpit and did not survive.
Contributing factors
- During the positioning flight for the third supervised marine pilot transfer at night, circling in the vicinity of outbound bulk carrier Squireship was conducted in a degraded visual cueing environment, with associated increases in pilot workload and risk of disorientation.
- Following a circuit, missed approach, and climb to 1,100 ft, a descent was initiated without coupling a vertical navigation mode of the autopilot. This was not consistent with standard operational practices and significantly increased the attentional demands on both pilots and associated risk of deviation from circuit procedure.
- During the downwind and base segment of the circuit, the pilots did not effectively monitor their flight instruments and the helicopter descended below the standard circuit profile at excessive rate with decaying airspeed. Neither pilot responded to the significantly abnormal flight path or parameters until the radio altimeter alert at 300 ft.
- The instructor responded to the radio altimeter alert, reducing the rate of descent from about 1,800 ft/min to 1,300 ft/min, but this response was not consistent with an emergency go-around and did not optimise recovery before collision with water.
- After the unexpected and significant water impact in dark conditions, the helicopter immediately rolled over and the cabin submerged then flooded. The instructor escaped through an adjacent hole in the windscreen and used flotation devices until rescued but the pilot under supervision was unable to escape the cockpit and did not survive.
- The instrument panels fitted to VH-ZGA and the operator's other EC135 helicopter at Port Hedland were equipped for single-pilot operation under the instrument flight rules. When used for flight training or checking in a degraded visual cueing environment, this configuration has a detrimental effect on the ability of an instructor or training/check pilot to monitor the helicopter's flight path and take over control if required. (Safety issue)
- When operating at Port Hedland in degraded visual cueing environments, the instructor had not been able to ensure that circling approaches were consistent with the operator's standard operating procedures. This probably limited the support provided to the pilot under supervision on the occurrence flight and, in combination with other factors, probably contributed to the abnormal flight path and partial recovery.
- The pilot under supervision was introduced to line flying at night in a degraded visual cueing environment immediately after completion of the minimum-required 10 ship landings by day and without any preparatory night flying. Given the pilot under supervision was transitioning from a different helicopter type and operational environment, the lack of consolidation contributed to high cognitive workload for both pilots and increased the risk of sustained flight path deviations.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.facebook.com/atsbgovau/photos/a.1655527014665323.1073741829.1638364093048282/2046335262251161/?type=3&theater
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-15/-helicopter-crashes-into-ocean-near-port-hedland/9550318
https://www.miragenews.com/search-for-missing-pilot-after-helicopter-ditches-off-port-hedland-wa/
https://www.smh.com.au/national/western-australia/search-for-survivor-after-helicopter-crashes-in-ocean-off-port-hedland-20180315-p4z4g1.html
https://thewest.com.au/news/north-west-telegraph/helicopter-lands-in-water-pilot-missing-ng-b88775288z
https://www.9news.com.au/national/2018/03/15/15/28/fullscale-search-underway-for-missing-helicopter-pilot-after-crash
https://www.amsa.gov.au/news-community/news-and-media-releases/search-missing-pilot-after-helicopter-ditches-port-hedland-wa
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-15/search-for-missing-pilot-helicopter-suspended-overnight/9553452
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/aair/ao-2018-022/
https://thewest.com.au/news/north-west-telegraph/search-resumes-for-missing-chopper-pilot-ng-b88776404z
http://www.news.com.au/national/western-australia/search-resumes-for-missing-port-hedland-helicopter-pilot/news-story/2217ea961abaf4eef70c95fbf841c7d5
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/grave-fears-for-wa-helicopter-crash-pilot/news-story/d97563c0b3546c88db35dab523f177a4
https://www.smh.com.au/national/western-australia/police-find-crashed-helicopter-and-body-believed-to-be-that-of-the-missing-pilot-20180317-h0xlyl.html
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/aair/ao-2018-022/
______________
http://www.aviatorgroup.com.au
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:195250/mmsi:636017230/imo:9391646/vessel:SQUIRESHIP
https://www.fleetmon.com/vessels/squireship_9391646_2064008/?language=en
https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-oj40k4u-cFY/WNpGxOruu_I/AAAAAAABG_0/dVyFASfAci85cKdNvMJDSndPpMFOVwyFQCLcB/s1600/DSC_0969.JPG (photo)
Location
Media:
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) will be investigating the ditching of a twin-engine EC135 helicopter which occurred approximately 30 km north-west of Port Hedland, Western Australia early on Thursday morning. Read more: https://t.co/3vBHkNaVyW pic.twitter.com/Y5HNAXyO1n
— ATSB (@atsbinfo) 14 mars 2018
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Mar-2018 22:42 | Iceman 29 | Added |
| 14-Mar-2018 23:17 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Total occupants, Other fatalities, Phase, Source, Embed code, Narrative] |
| 14-Mar-2018 23:30 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 00:41 | Geno | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Source] |
| 15-Mar-2018 06:31 | Kardz | Updated [Date, Time, Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Phase, Nature, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative, Plane category] |
| 15-Mar-2018 07:24 | Aerossurance | Updated [Location, Destination airport, Source] |
| 15-Mar-2018 07:27 | Aerossurance | Updated [Damage, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 07:42 | Aerossurance | Updated [Aircraft type, Operator, Source, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 07:49 | Aerossurance | Updated [Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 08:09 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Date, Time, Source, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 08:38 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 08:40 | Aerossurance | Updated [Time, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 18:29 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 15-Mar-2018 23:05 | Geno | Updated [Source] |
| 16-Mar-2018 06:35 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Source] |
| 16-Mar-2018 08:08 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 16-Mar-2018 11:46 | gerard57 | Updated [Total fatalities, Source, Narrative] |
| 16-Mar-2018 12:11 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 16-Mar-2018 12:38 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Operator, Narrative] |
| 16-Mar-2018 17:23 | Aerossurance | Updated [Narrative] |
| 17-Mar-2018 08:18 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Narrative] |
| 17-Mar-2018 08:18 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Source] |
| 17-Mar-2018 08:23 | Aerossurance | Updated [Narrative] |
| 19-Mar-2018 11:17 | Kardz | Updated [Date, Time, Operator, Narrative] |
| 03-May-2018 09:51 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 03-May-2018 10:05 | Aerossurance | Updated [Narrative] |
| 03-May-2018 11:05 | Aerossurance | Updated [Time, Operator, Source] |
| 20-Jun-2022 17:30 | harro | Updated [Narrative, Accident report] |
| 21-Jun-2022 01:36 | RobertMB | Updated [Source] |
| 12-Nov-2023 18:25 | harro | Updated [Other fatalities, Location, Narrative, Category] |
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