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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 230748
Last updated: 27 November 2021
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Date:22-JUN-2018
Time:13:35
Type:Silhouette image of generic CP10 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Mudry CAP 10B
Owner/operator:Marine nationale
Registration: 111-F-YSDC
MSN: 111
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Category:Accident
Location:Base d’aéronautique navale de Lanvéoc-Poulmic -   France
Phase: Taxi
Nature:Military
Departure airport:BAN Lanvéoc-Poulmic
Destination airport:BAN Lanvéoc-Poulmic
Investigating agency: BEA-É
Narrative:
An instructor and a student pilot were scheduled to complete a series of circuits as part of an in-flight selection mission. During the taxi to reach the threshold of runway 05, the student encountered difficulties in maintaining the taxiway axis. The instructor took over the controls and directed the aircraft to the holding point. Detecting a burning smell and smoke, the instructor decided to cancel the takeoff and return to the parking lot via the runway. After a few metres, a fire broke out. The instructor ordered the evacuation.
The rescue team intervened and managed to put out the fire. The aircraft was heavily damaged. The crew is unharmed.


3.2 Causes of the event
The following elements contributed to the event:
- the trivialization of brake problems leading to a lack of feedback;
- the non-application of the service bulletin leading to the retention of old master cylinders on CAP 10Bs;
- the accumulation of several anomalies in the brake system leading to the maintenance of residual brake pressure on the left and the absence of criteria for judging the wear of the master cylinders and brake blocks;
- the absence of removal and inspection of the stop part, forgotten by the two maintenance organizations;
- the instructor continues to drive the vehicle even though his left brake pedal is very soft;
- the rudder deflection opposite the expected position not identified by the crew;
- the wheel fairing to increase the temperature around the brake block;
- the brake fluid piping material is not resistant to temperature rise and causes hydraulic fluid to leak as it melts;
- the brake fluid and materials used in the composition of the wheel fairing, which are highly flammable;
- the instructor's failure to apply the "floor smoke" checklist;
- the wind promoting the spread of the fire to the airframe and aft of the fuselage.

Sources:

BEA-É

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: BEA-É
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 4 months
Download report: Final report


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
18-Nov-2019 15:41 harro Added
18-Nov-2019 15:44 harro Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Accident report, ]

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