ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 247169
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| Date: | Sunday 21 November 2004 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Bombardier DHC-8-402Q Dash 8 |
| Owner/operator: | Air Nippon Network |
| Registration: | JA841A |
| MSN: | 4080 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 19 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Kochi Airport -
 Japan
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Osaka International Airport |
| Kochi Airport | |
| Investigating agency: | ARAIC |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
A Bombardier DHC-8-402, JA841A, operated by Air Nippon Network took off from Osaka International Airport at 13:51 Japanese Standard Time as All Nippon Airways Flight 1617 on a regularly scheduled service.
When the aircraft landed on Runway 32 of Kochi Airport, the destination, the right main wheels ran off the side of the runway and the aircraft stopped there. There were 19 people on board, consisting of the pilot in command (PIC), three other crewmembers, and 15 passengers. There were no injuries.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
The causal factors to this serious incident are estimated as follows: When the aircraft landed during crosswind conditions at Kochi Airport, the nose wheels were centered and in caster mode; these conditions made it difficult to stop the aircraft heading drift to the right and the aircraft ran off the runway despite efforts made by the PIC and the first officer to correct the direction using rudder pedals, steering control handle, differential wheel brake and differential power.
With regard to the reason the nose-wheels were in caster mode, it is estimated that the steering function by SCU was lost temporarily due to the PIC’s operation of the steering control handle in excess of ±8 degrees when he was attempting to stop the heading drift while the WOW sensors were detecting an “in-air” condition or within one second after they had detected an “on-ground” condition. Contributing to the PIC’s operation of the steering control handle in this manner is the company’s failure to train relevant flight crew using the manufacturer’s advisory information on control of the aircraft.
With regard to the failure to stop the aircraft heading drift to the right despite the PIC’s corrective control measures using differential wheel brake and differential power, it is estimated that the PIC did not perform these operations appropriately. Contributing to this is the fact that the relevant descriptions in the company’s manuals were unclear and that appropriate training was not given by the company to the PIC for operations such as braking during landing roll.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
JTSB
Images:
Photo: ARAIC
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 27-Jan-2021 21:00 | harro | Added |
| 27-Jan-2021 21:01 | harro | Updated [Narrative] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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