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| Date: | Tuesday 3 December 2002 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Airbus A300B4-603 |
| Owner/operator: | Lufthansa |
| Registration: | D-AIAK |
| MSN: | 401 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1987 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 53021 hours |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 205 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | near München -
 Germany
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | München-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM) |
| Frankfurt International Airport (FRA/EDDF) | |
| Investigating agency: | BFU |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
While climbing to cruise level with autopilot (AP2) engaged, the crew noticed during a routine check of the instruments that the allowed airspeed (Vmo) would be exceeded. As a countermeasure the preset speed was reduced and a higher climb rate selected on the AP panel. The AP was disengaged after it was noted that the airspeed increased further and the nose started to drop. Once the pilot took control of the a/c it was trimmed nose down. It was no longer in climb and the max allowed airspeed was exceeded by 16kt. A great amount of control forces had to be applied until the wrong trim could be; corrected by means of the electrical trim device. Vertical acceleration was so great during the re-establishment of the original flight attitude that one crew member fell and injured herself slightly. The flight was continued with disengaged AP and no further incidents.
Causes for the serious incident
- As a result of the deferred elimination of a fault on PTS 1 the AP could be operated with PTS 2 only.
- There was a fault on PTS 2 for which there was no confirmation or elimination
- At a certain airspeed the signal interruption between engaged AP 2 and PTS 2 caused a continuous change of the THS in direction of pitch down.
- Because of a system deficiency caused by the software error in FAC 2 the continuous change of the THS did not result in a warning and the self-deactivation of the system.
- The prescribed procedure for abnormal functions (AOM) of the trimable horizontal stabilizer was not executed in time.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
BFU 5X011-0/02
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 12-Sep-2024 13:29 | ASN | Added |
| 14-Sep-2024 07:40 | ASN | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Location, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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