ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 45421
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| Date: | Sunday 22 September 2002 |
| Time: | 15:30 |
| Type: |  Rans S-12XL Airaile |
| Owner/operator: | Private |
| Registration: | N725ST |
| MSN: | 03990875 |
| Engine model: | Rotax 912S |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Mexican Hat, UT -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Manoeuvring (airshow, firefighting, ag.ops.) |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Blanding, UT (BDG) |
| Durango, CO (CD82) | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The pilot flew up the canyon, looking for a campsite for a future trip. Witnesses observed the aircraft make a "tight" U-turn in the canyon, and then deploy a parachute. The parachute separated from the airplane, and the airplane free fell, impacting the terrain. Witnesses heard the engine running, all the way to impact. A postimpact fire consumed the airplane. The Ballistic Recovery System (BRS), installed on this airplane was a BRS VLS (Vertical Launch System) 1200 model. The system contained a warning label that states "Aircraft Engine Must Be Shut Off Prior to Deploying Parachute. Failure to Do So May Result in Death or Serious Injury." The BRS unit was shipped to the pilot on August 9, 2002; he performed the installation. An examination of the airplane showed the two carabineers next to each other in the airplane wreckage. If the BRS system had been assembled properly, they should have been approximately 10 feet apart. The 14 foot 11-3/4 inch riser was found cut at one end. The other end was still attached to the suspension lines of the parachute. Approximately 4 feet of the riser was consumed by fire. The physical evidence revealed that the protective Kevlar bridle (resistant to propeller slashes) had been inadvertently removed from the BRS system during installation.
Probable Cause: the pilot's inadequate in-flight planning and decision making (flying up a canyon with insufficient altitude) which resulted in an inadvertent stall/mush, and the pilot's failure to follow the proper emergency procedures for activating his Ballistic Recovery System (shutting off his pusher engine before deploying the BRS parachute). Contributing factors were the improper installation of the BRS by the pilot which led to the subsequent severing of the parachute line by his propeller during deployment.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
NTSB: https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=20020926X05216&key=1
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Oct-2008 00:45 | ASN archive | Added |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:24 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 09-Dec-2017 17:47 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Operator, Source, Narrative] |
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