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| Date: | Thursday 9 July 1998 |
| Time: | 11:45 |
| Type: |  Airbus A300B4-605R |
| Owner/operator: | American Airlines |
| Registration: | N70072 |
| MSN: | 515 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 185 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Location: | Near London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
| Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS/KBOS) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The crew were operating a scheduled flight from London Heathrow (LHR) Airport to Logan
International Airport, Boston, USA; the weather was good with a light south westerly surface wind
for take off. There were no significant defects in the technical log and the aircraft appeared fully
serviceable during the external and pre-start checks. Both engine starts were normal and the
commander taxied out to Runway 27 Left. He was the handling pilot for the sector and used
reduced power for a normal take off at 1137 hrs.
Everything appeared serviceable during the take off and initial climb but, as the aircraft climbed
through Flight Level (FL) 100, the first officer saw the right 'Oil Filter Clog' caution light
illuminate and reported this fact to the commander. Initially, the light flickered on and off, as did
the indication on the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM). However, after a short time,
both the 'Oil Filter Clog' light and the ECAM indication remained on and steady. The crew checked
the other engine indications but they were all normal; additionally, there were no asymmetric
handling indications and no abnormal vibration. With clearance from ATC, the commander
levelled N70072 at FL 150. Then, with the caution still indicating, the commander instructed the
first officer to action the appropriate emergency drills. Initially, this required the No 2 throttle to be
retarded to a position at which the caution light would go out. However, with the throttle at idle the
light continually flickered on and off. Then, after 3 minutes at idle, the 'Oil Filter Clog' light was on
and steady and the commander, in accordance with the emergency drills and in consultation with
the first officer, decided to shutdown No 2 engine. With the commander retaining handling duties,
the first officer actioned the appropriate drills.
After the drill was completed, the crew declared an emergency to ATC and stated that they wished
to return to LHR; they were given full co-operation by ATC. Then, with the aircraft established
back towards LHR, the commander briefed the purser on the situation and of his intentions, and
informed the passengers. The recovery was uneventful and the aircraft landed on Runway 27 Right
at LHR at 1230 hrs. The LHR emergency vehicles had been alerted by ATC and had pre-positioned
on the taxiway adjacent to the western end of the runway.
The aircraft weight on landing was 368,000 lb and the crew used a configuration of Slat 15/ Flap 20
with a Vref speed of 166 kt. Normal maximum landing weight is 308,700 lb but, with no fuel
jettison system, overweight landings are permitted in an emergency at any weight within the
maximum take-off weight of 378,590 lb. For the landing, the crew had preselected the autobrakes
to the 'LO' setting, thereby selecting a deceleration rate of 1.7 m/sec2. The crew assessed the
touchdown as smooth, at less than 300 feet/min rate of descent and within 1,500 feet of the
threshold; speed on touchdown was approximately 165 kt and the surface wind was reported as
240°/13 kt. On the ground, the first officer confirmed that the spoilers had deployed and the
commander selected medium reverse thrust on the left engine. The crew recalled that the autobrake
had disconnected following the commander's use of manual brake during the ground roll and the
first officer then selected 'Brake Fans'. Neither crew member considered the retardation as
excessive and, although the commander was confident that he could have turned the aircraft off the
runway early, he allowed it to roll to the last exit. As N70072 was turned off the runway, ATC
advised the crew that there were no visible problems and transferred them to the Airport Fire
Service (AFS) frequency; as they cleared the runway, the crew noted that the left brake
temperatures were normal but that all four right brake temperatures were indicating at the gauge
maximum of 700°C.
Once clear of the runway, the crew brought the aircraft to a halt, established contact with the AFS
and informed the fire officer of the brake temperature indications. The fire officer confirmed that
there was smoke coming from the right main landing gear area and asked the commander to keep
N70072 stopped and to shut down the left engine to allow the AFS unhindered access to the
aircraft. Shortly afterwards, the fire officer reported to the crew that there was a small fire in the
area of the right gear but that it was under control. The commander confirmed with him that there
was no need to evacuate but then briefed the purser and asked her to be prepared to react quickly if
the situation changed. Thereafter, the flight crew maintained a close liaison with the AFS and the
cabin crew. The AFS used water to cool the brakes and stayed in attendance until the passengers
had disembarked normally through door 4L using portable steps.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f88940f0b61346000747/dft_avsafety_pdf_501407.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7583026 (Photo)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 31-Mar-2025 18:40 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 31-Mar-2025 18:40 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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