Accident de Havilland DH.82a Tiger Moth (Sk11A) Fv.518,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 78777
 
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Date:Tuesday 3 November 1936
Time:morning
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH82 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
de Havilland DH.82a Tiger Moth (Sk11A)
Owner/operator:F5 Flygvapnet (Swedish Air Force)
Registration: Fv.518
MSN: 50
Fatalities:Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Location:Brandsberga, 2 km from Ljungbyhed, Klippan Municipality, Skåne County, -   Sweden
Phase: En route
Nature:Military
Departure airport:F5 Ljungbyhed, Klippan Municipality, Skåne County,
Destination airport:F5 Ljungbyhed, Klippan Municipality, Skåne County,
Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources
Narrative:
de Havilland DH.82a Tiger Moth (Sk 11A) MSN 50 (Gipsy Major #8121): Taken on charge by Swedish AF (Flygvapnet) as 5518; to Centrala Flygverkstaden Malmslätt Teknologkurs 6.7.35. Crashed on landing 1.8.35; repaired by 21.8.35. To F 5 Ljungbyhed 7.9.35 after repairs. To Fv 518 10.35; coded ‘5-22’. Fitted 2.36 with Gipsy Major #5855. Fitted 9.36 with Gipsy Major #8120.

Spun in and crashed Brandsberga, 2 km from Ljungbyhed, Klippan Municipality, Skåne County, Sweden 3.11.36; Pilot Jan Axel Erland Anger (aged 23) bailed out (too low) and was killed. According to a rough translation from Swedish into English of the accident report (see link #4 for the original Swedish text):

"Accident 1936-11-03 at Brandsberga, Ljungbyhed
Engine: Gipsy Major no. 8120
Aspirant Jan A.E Anger killed
From the Accident Commission report To the Chief of the Air Force.
'Since the head of the air force on November 3, 1936 ordered the undersigned Örnberg as chairman as well as captain Björsell, flight engineer Söderberg and secretary Norrman to be members of the air force's accident commission for the investigation of an air accident that occurred on November 3, 1936 with aircraft type Sk 11A no. 518, brought by the aspirant at the air war school Anger, although ordered the accident commission to immediately leave for Ljungbyhed, the commission happened there on the morning of November 4.

In the presence of the commander of the air warfare school, Captain Hinnersson, the commission met in the premises of the air warfare school.

For an investigation into the circumstances of the accident, the commission had been handed over the protocol, taken the previous day during a preliminary hearing concerning the accident, which protocol was to be attached as an attachment to the commission's report.

After presentation of the protocol, the commission went to the accident site, located approx. 2 km from F 5: s location. It was recorded that the aircraft was completely destroyed and that - judging by the tracks in the ground - Anger fell approximately 8 metres from the aircraft.

During the inspection of the aircraft, nothing of a nature that should be noted here was observed. After this, the commission went back to the air warfare school and carried out an examination of the parachute worn by Anger on the occasion in question, type Irving, No. 9754. Over examination, which was carried out in technical terms by the member Söderberg, a special protocol was drawn up, which was to be attached as an appendix (fig. 2 ) is attached to the commission's report.

After this, Lieutenant Thunberg was heard, who said: Thunberg had arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after the accident. By then only a few people had made it there, namely a department from the station. No one had touched Anger. He had been lying 2 m from the mark after the impact of his body on his back with his head resting on the parachute. He had been lying "straightened up, as if someone had put him up with a parachute under his head". The doctor, Dr. Kollberg, had arrived at about the same time and stated that Anger had already passed away. From the position of the body and the mark in the ground, it could be concluded that the body hit the ground at a somewhat oblique angle. The grass had been pressed down in the direction of the place where the body lay. From the information provided by those present, it had emerged that no one touched the parachute or Anger, from which it could be concluded, that the parachute detached either before or after impact. Anger had knocked down more ferret less in the supine position. He had not been soiled on the front. It could therefore possibly be assumed that the QR lock was not pushed in or released upon impact but earlier.

Regarding the training of the aspirants, Thunberg announced that they started flying around August 1 this year. During the second period, which ended on October 31, they would have undergone up to and including exercise no. 34, i.e. advanced emergency landing exercises.

Lieutenant Naeslund was then heard and gave an account of educational conditions etc. at the Air Force Academy. The Aspirant No. 153 Iacobi. had witnessed the accident, Anger had first done a left spin of no more than 3 - 4 turns, which immediately turned into a right spin that lasted 200 - 300 m.

Iacobi, who previously belonged to the same group as Anger, had practiced spin about 10 times without difficulty and discomfort. He considered himself sufficiently educated for the exercises in question.

The aspirant no. 155 Almström. Almström had also witnessed the accident. Anger had started with a straight stall of 1,200 – 1,300 m, which turned into a steep left spin. At first the aircraft seemed to want to straighten up, but then it had gone into a right spin. This transition had been almost instantaneous.

Almström had never accidentally gotten into a spin during his education, but he, like the other students, had been taught how to get out of it.

Aspirant no. 157, Hedström. Hedström also belonged to Anger's student group. It wouldn't be difficult to perform the maneuvers in question here, but the first time you might get "a little confused". Hedström had done spin in single command four times, but this had not been included in the exercises ordered to him.
Lieutenant Christiernsson. Until a few months ago, he had been a group teacher for Anger's student group. After this there had been a new division into groups. As a pilot, Anger had been relatively "bad, hard and insensitive". Christiernsson assumed that Anger came into spin after folding but was wrong about the direction of the spin. Namely, the machine had "cut over" in the opposite spin. Anger must have been with the spin rudder and made a turn or we were spinning to the left, but gave such a "sudden rudder" that the machine went into the opposite spin. This had happened in immediate connection with the folding or at the exit of the folding. Christiernsson had seen that students from Anger's group at some point had an involuntary spin, but did not know if Anger had done a spin in a single command.

Sergeant Sjunnesson refuted his information recorded in the interrogation protocol and added that Sjunnesson had flown with Anger once. This one had been "hard on the rudder" but probably not directly unsuitable for flight.

Vice-Corporal No. 24 Larsson told in accordance with the interrogation protocol. Larsson was not a trained pilot himself.

Vice-Corporal No. 35 Vidung declared himself to be maintaining what he stated according to the interrogation protocol and added, what he knew, that in order to get out of the spin it would be necessary to lie at a higher altitude than Anger did when Vidung observed him. However, Vidung had heard from people who observed the entire course of the accident that the machine came into a bank, but then went into a spin in the other direction. It had been assumed that Anger did not understand the situation, but held on to the rudders, that he released them first at a height of 150 m to jump, and that the machine then went straight towards the ground".

Struck off charge 4.12.36.

Sources:

1. Dagbladet 3 November 1936
2. https://air-britain.com/pdfs/production-lists/DH82.pdf
3. https://www.svenskagravar.se/gravsatt/45652685 (Swedish text)
4. https://forum.flyghistoria.org/viewtopic.php?f=120&t=11354
5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_Air_Force_Flying_School#History

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
17-Oct-2010 02:47 Masen63 Added
17-Oct-2010 14:31 Anon. Updated [Aircraft type, Other fatalities]
22-Nov-2016 20:00 TB Updated [Aircraft type, Operator, Source]
19-Sep-2017 16:03 TB Updated [Time, Phase, Source, Narrative]
30-Jul-2021 16:22 Dr. John Smith Updated [Registration, Operator, Location, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Category]
27-Sep-2023 09:12 Nepa Updated [[Registration, Operator, Location, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Category]]

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