Loss of control Accident Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain N509FN,
ASN logo
ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 93
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Date:Saturday 5 January 2008
Type:Silhouette image of generic PA31 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain
Owner/operator:Servant Air, Inc.
Registration: N509FN
MSN: 31-7952162
Year of manufacture:1979
Total airframe hrs:13130 hours
Engine model:Lycoming TIO-540 Serie
Fatalities:Fatalities: 6 / Occupants: 10
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Location:Kodiak Airport, Kodiak, Alaska -   United States of America
Phase: Initial climb
Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:Kodiak, AK (ADQ)
Destination airport:Homer, AK (HOM)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The airline transport pilot and nine passengers were departing in a twin-engine airplane on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight from a runway adjacent to an ocean bay. According to the air traffic control tower specialist on duty, the airplane became airborne about midway down the runway. As it approached the end of the runway, the pilot said he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason. The specialist cleared the airplane to land on any runway. As the airplane began a right turn, it rolled sharply to the right and began a rapid, nose- and right-wing-low descent. The airplane crashed about 200 yards offshore and the fragmented wreckage sank in the 10-foot-deep water. Survivors were rescued by a private float plane. A passenger reported that the airplane's nose baggage door partially opened just after takeoff, and fully opened into a locked position when the pilot initiated a right turn towards the airport. The nose baggage door is mounted on the left side of the nose, just forward of the pilot's windscreen. When the door is opened, it swings upward, and is held open by a latching device. To lock the baggage door, the handle is placed in the closed position and the handle is then locked by rotating a key lock, engaging a locking cam. With the locking cam in the locked position, removal of the key prevents the locking cam from moving. The original equipment key lock is designed so the key can only be removed when the locking cam is engaged. Investigation revealed that the original key lock on the airplane's forward baggage door had been replaced with an unapproved thumb-latch device. A Safety Board materials engineer's examination revealed evidence that a plastic guard inside the baggage compartment, which is designed to protect the door's locking mechanism from baggage/cargo, appeared not to be installed at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's only required inspection of the latching system was a visual inspection every 100 hours of service. Additionally, the mechanical components of the forward baggage door latch mechanism were considered "on condition" items, with no predetermined life-limit. On May 29, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety alert for operators (SAFO 08013), recommending a visual inspection of the baggage door latches and locks, additional training of flight and ground crews, and the removal of unapproved lock devices. In July 2008, Piper Aircraft issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB 1194, later 1194A), requiring the installation of a key lock device, mandatory recurring inspection intervals, life-limits on safety-critical parts of forward baggage door components, and the installation of a placard on the forward baggage door with instructions for closing and locking the door to preclude an in-flight opening. Postaccident inspection discovered no mechanical discrepancies with the airplane other than the baggage door latch. The airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook did not contain emergency procedures for an in-flight opening of the nose baggage door, nor did the operator's pilot training program include instruction on the proper operation of the nose baggage door or procedures to follow in case of an in-flight opening of the door. Absent findings of any other mechanical issues, it is likely the door locking mechanism was not fully engaged and/or the baggage shifted during takeoff, and contacted the exposed internal latching mechanism, allowing the cargo door to open. With the airplane operating at a low airspeed and altitude, the open baggage door would have incurred additional aerodynamic drag and further reduced the airspeed. The pilot's immediate turn towards the airport, with the now fully open baggage door, likely resulted in a sudden increase in drag, with a substantive decrease in airspeed, and an aerodynamic stall.
Probable Cause: The failure of company maintenance personnel to ensure that the airplane's nose baggage door latching mechanism was properly configured and maintained, resulting in an inadvertent opening of the nose baggage door in flight. Contributing to the accident were the lack of information and guidance available to the operator and pilot regarding procedures to follow should a baggage door open in flight and an inadvertent aerodynamic stall.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: ANC08MA038
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 3 months
Download report: Final report


FAA register: 2. FAA: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?omni=Home-N-Number&nNumberTxt=509FN



Photo: Alaska State Troopers

Revision history:

20-Jan-2008 11:47 harro Added
09-Dec-2009 09:43 Anon. Updated
02-Feb-2010 10:58 PL Updated [Cn, Narrative]
16-Mar-2010 14:27 harro Updated [[Cn, Narrative]]
21-Dec-2016 19:12 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]
21-Dec-2016 19:13 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]
21-Dec-2016 19:14 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]
21-Dec-2016 19:16 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]
21-Dec-2016 19:20 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]
17-Sep-2017 18:27 Dr. John Smith Updated [Time, Location, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative]
20-Oct-2017 15:36 Dr. John Smith Updated [Operator, Source]
03-Dec-2017 09:25 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Operator, Other fatalities, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2024 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314